Check the version of CCleaner on your computer.However, CCleaner stats that they have not detected an execution of the second stage payload and believe that its activation is highly unlikely. It also reads a reply from the same IP address and downloads a second stage payload from that address, further encrypted by the same algorithm as in the first stage. Additional information whether the process is running with administrator privileges, whether it is a 64-bit system, etc.MAC addresses of first three network adapters.List of installed software, including Windows updates.The compromised version will collect the following information about the local system and encrypt them before sending off to a remote IP address or a different location if the IP address becomes unavailable. Credit: What can these hacked versions do? If you are running a version later than these two or running the same version but on a 64-bit of Windows, you are safe. Two versions released between August 15 and September 12, 2017, are affected.Only Windows 32-bit edition is affected.If you are using CCleaner to help you keep your system clean, here is what you need to know, according to the CCleaner’s official blog post and Cisco Talos post. Even if you were monitoring all outbound communication, you most likely would have allowed it since the process was running from the CCleaner directory.CCleaner, one of the most popular system tools on Windows, was confirmed to be compromised early this month, resulting in up to 3% of CCleaner’s users, roughly around 2 million, are/were using two compromised versions of CCleaner on their Windows computers. This is also "iffy" since the CCleaner updater most likely created a new process most like likely in its own directory and used that process to perform the remote communication. By "aggressive" I mean that CCleaner would be only allowed to connect its known update servers and nothing else. One way this could have been user detected was through aggressive outbound network monitoring. This is "point proof" that the Next Gen/AI algorithms are also totally ineffective against this. No one detected the malware prior to its discovery in mid-Aug and subsequent public disclosure earlier this week. The backdoor was a validity signed executable in a trusted software update download. I could understand that zero day did not recognize the threat, but please, was active almost a month and no one else noticed, or who knows how many months they would have taken to do so. The reality of the situation is no one knows for sure what system modification occurred through use of the backdoor in the month or more it was resident on one's device. There are currently a lot of users, based on posted comments in the security forums, who believe they are now safe since security solutions are detecting and removing the original backdoor. Case in point was the EternalBlue set backdoor and later delivered malware that used that backdoor and closed it so no one else could use it. Once activated not only can the original hacker use it but so can anyone else. My statement is a backdoor is a backdoor. Avast in my opinion is spreading FUD by their statement that the second stage of the backdoor never activated therefore no actual malware payload was downloaded. Would be helpful if Eset published an article on recommended mitigation to anyone affected this.Ĭisco already publically stated restore prior to Aug. As only two smaller distribution products (the 32 bit and cloud versions, Windows only) were compromised, the actual number of users affected by this incident was 2.27M.
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